postdoc (M/F)

CNRS; France; Sur place; EUR 35 000 - 45 000; Plein temps

Résumé du poste

A renowned research organization in France is looking for a postdoctoral researcher to enhance the security of electronic voting systems. The role includes tasks like analyzing security protocols, developing new security definitions, and studying post-quantum cryptography. Candidates should have expertise in electronic voting and be trained in security proofs. This position is full-time with a planned start date in January 2026.

Qualifications

• Strong expertise in electronic voting systems design or analysis.
• Training in security proofs for protocols in cryptographic or symbolic models.

Responsabilités

• Improve security of electronic voting systems.
• Conduct security analysis of voting protocols.
• Develop security definitions for ballot secrecy and verifiability.
• Study transition to post-quantum cryptography.

Connaissances

Expertise in electronic voting

Security proofs for protocols

Cryptographic models

Symbolic models

Formation

PhD in relevant field

Description du poste

Organisation/Company CNRS Department Laboratoire lorrain de recherche en informatique et ses applications Research Field Physics Researcher Profile First Stage Researcher (R1) Country France Application Deadline 30 Dec 2025 - 23:59 (UTC) Type of Contract Temporary Job Status Full-time Hours Per Week 35 Offer Starting Date 26 Jan 2026 Is the job funded through the EU Research Framework Programme? Not funded by a EU programme Is the Job related to staff position within a Research Infrastructure? No

Offer Description

The overall objective of the postdoc is to improve the security of electronic voting systems.

A first task will consist of a security analysis of the voting protocol developed by SwissPost. This will involve developing security definitions for ballot secrecy and verifiability, and carrying out a proof within a cryptographic model. The security of the protocol may also be studied in a symbolic model, for example using ProVerif.

Other possible topics include designing security definitions related to electronic voting, such as vote buying or coercion resistance, for complex protocols that are not simply “vote and go” like Helios or Belenios. For example, protocols such as Selene or Hyperion involve voter checks after tallying, and none of the existing definitions can handle this. All these protocols are academic protocols published in the literature.

Another proposed direction is studying the transition to post-quantum cryptography by focusing on protocols that are not only resistant to quantum computers but also remain secure even if post-quantum schemes are broken. In other words, the goal is to propose primitives or a hybrid protocol capable of supporting the transition to the post-quantum era.

• research meetings
• work progress reports
• development of definitions and proofs
• article writing
• participation in team seminars and conferences

The work will be carried out within the Pesto team at LORIA, and also in collaboration with Pierrick Gaudry (Caramba team). The Pesto team focuses on the formal analysis of security protocols and studies many protocols, including electronic voting. The team has developed the Belenios voting system and proposed numerous definitions related to voting security. Team members have studied many voting systems in France (industrial contracts with market leaders) and abroad (systems from the Canton of Geneva and from the company Scytl), both from theoretical perspectives (proving desirable properties; discovering vulnerabilities) and practical ones (balancing practical feasibility with academic requirements).

The candidate must have strong expertise in electronic voting (either in design or analysis). They must also be trained in security proofs for protocols, either in cryptographic models or symbolic models.